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The COVID-19 global pandemic led governments, health agencies, and technology companies to
work on solutions to minimize the spread of the disease. One such solution concerns contact-
tracing apps whose utility is tied to widespread adoption. Using survey data collected a few
weeks into lockdown measures in the United States, we explore Americans’ willingness to install
a COVID-19 tracking app. Specifically, we evaluate how the distributor of such an app (e.g.,
government, health-protection agency, technology company) affects people’s willingness to
adopt the tool. While we find that 67 percent of respondents are willing to install an app from at
least one of the eight providers included, the factors that predict one’s willingness to adopt differ.
Using Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as contextual integrity, we explore differences in
responses across distributors and discuss why some distributors may be viewed as less
appropriate than others in the context of providing health-related apps during a global pandemic.
We conclude the paper by providing policy recommendations for wide-scale data collection that










In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic (World
Health Organization, 2020). As infections increased globally, companies and governments
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rushed to develop technological solutions to trace infections and minimize the spread of the
disease (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020; eHealth Network, 2020). Most
tools being developed focused on scaling contact-tracing and tracking efforts (hereafter referred
to as “contact-tracing apps”), a method used for decades to reduce disease spread by notifying
those who have been in contact with an infected individual (World Health Organization, 2017).
Contact-tracing apps use Bluetooth signals or GPS location data to identify phones that come in
close proximity to the phone of an infected person (as determined by submission of COVID-19
test results) and notify the users of those “exposed” phones that they have come into contact with
someone infected with COVID-19. While some countries and public health departments have
chosen to build their own contact-tracing apps (Kelion, 2020), others are being built on Google
and Apple’s “exposure notification system” (ENS) infrastructure (Google/Apple, 2020). The
Google/Apple partnership is particularly noteworthy as the two companies are competitors that
account for the vast majority of smartphone operating systems globally so a collaboration such as
this is unusual. Additionally, they have made privacy a cornerstone of the technology (Nellis and
Dave, 2020; Sherr, 2020).
As of this writing, use of most contact-tracing apps is voluntary; making app adoption voluntary
rather than required is critical to protecting civil liberties (Díaz, 2020). There are many questions
and unknowns about who may access the data, how long those data are stored, and for what
purposes said data might be used in the future (Redmiles, 2020). The downside of a voluntary
app is that it will not be an effective deterrent without widespread adoption, and recent polls
suggest Americans are skeptical of the tools. A Pew survey in April 2020 found that most
American adults (60 percent) did not think a tracking app would make a difference in stopping
the spread of the disease (Anderson and Auxier, 2020). Likewise, an April 2020 University of
Maryland-Washington Post poll found that nearly 60 percent of Americans are currently
unwilling or unable (due to not owning a smartphone) to use an app to help track coronavirus
spread (Timberg, et al., 2020). The poll also found low trust in health insurance firms and
technology companies like Google and Apple. This lack of trust might increase reticence to use
an app, even one employing privacy-preserving strategies.
How to increase trust in and adoption of contact-tracing apps raises the following question: Does
the distributor of the app affect one’s likelihood to embrace the technology? In this paper, we
answer this question by analyzing survey data from a sample of American adults collected in
April 2020. We asked respondents whether they would install a contact-tracing app from various
distributors. We examine what factors correlate with willingness to install an app from (1) any of
the proposed distributors; (2) more than one distributor; and (3) each specific distributor. Some
factors like age, Internet skills, and medical circumstances are consistently important to
respondents’ assessment, while others vary across app distributors.
We examine these findings through the lens of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010), a
framework that moves beyond public-private dichotomies to account for numerous parameters
within specific contexts when determining appropriate information flows. We focus on the role
of the actor and transmission principle of the contextual integrity framework in identifying
violations of contextual integrity, and the role of institutional trust in this process. We conclude
the paper by discussing broader policy implications of this research for considering responses to
crises and other large-scale events that require widespread data collection.
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Related work
In this section, we summarize research regarding institutional trust, which may affect people’s
likelihood of using a contact-tracing app from a particular institutional distributor, as well as
frameworks for thinking more broadly about privacy and disclosure in health contexts such as
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Consumer trust in organizations and institutions
Institutional trust plays a significant role in the adoption and continuation of using products and
services (Fukuyama, 1995). Trust generally refers to people’s willingness to be vulnerable to
other people or institutions (Pirson, et al., 2019). Put another way, institutional trust can be
understood as the “extent to which that partner is viewed as unlikely to exploit any
vulnerabilities the other partner has,” and includes perceptions of ability, benevolence, and
integrity [1].
As noted by Ermisch and colleagues (2009), decisions about whether to trust another entity
involve three components: (1) a consideration of the returns when trust expectations are fulfilled
versus costs when they are not; (2) a probability calculation of the likelihood that the trustee
(e.g., an app distributor) will do as expected; and (3) an assessment of the risk of being exploited
by the trustee. Trust can be personal — focused narrowly on an individual — or, more often,
generalized toward a category of people or institutions (Rotter, et al., 1972). Generalized trust
toward popular online e-commerce companies, for example, can serve as a simple heuristic to
help individuals decide whether or not to trust a Web site with their credit card information.
Trust serves as a social and economic lubricant in both interpersonal interactions and in
facilitating transactions between people and institutions (Putnam, 2000). When considering
public trust in institutions, Pirson and colleagues (2019) point to both individual and institution-
based factors that play a role in decision-making. In their research, public trust in an institution
was positively influenced by people’s previous experience with said institution and negatively
affected by a person’s age. Men were more likely to trust a company than women when
controlling for other factors. Likewise, firms whose missions were connected to societal benefits
were viewed as more trustworthy.
Historically, trust has been closely connected to economic outcomes (Fukuyama, 1995) and has
provided a competitive advantage to institutions (Barney and Hansen, 1994). When trust in an
institution decreases, people are more likely to turn to a competitor or alternate solution.
However, research shows a steady decline of trust in recent decades across many domains (Cook
and Schilke, 2010). For example, Imber (2008) details declining trust in doctors over the
twentieth century. Findings from the Pew Research Center highlight decreased trust in the federal
government following Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance (Rainie and Duggan,
2016; Rainie, et al., 2019).
Public trust in technology companies has been decreasing over the last decade following a
number of security breaches and other violations of users’ privacy expectations. For example, in
a 2019 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll (Murray, 2019), nearly two-thirds of Americans said they
do not trust Facebook to protect their data. This lack of trust in the company can be connected to
the Cambridge Analytica scandal as well as media reports on their “emotional contagion” study
(Selinger and Hartzog, 2016). However, these violations in trust have not slowed down the
popularity of the platform, which has continued to grow in the months and years following these
events.
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During a crisis, trust becomes both more and less important. In the case of COVID-19, people
need more trust in the institutions (e.g., federal government, technology companies) that are
working toward a solution. This is especially important when considering contact-tracing apps,
which require significant buy-in to be successful. If people do not trust the entity creating and
distributing an app — be it the government, public health institutions, businesses, or technology
companies — they are probably less likely to use it. Those working toward solutions need to take
steps associated with building trust to ensure buy-in, which could include transparency in terms
of data being collected and data-minimization practices to limit both the amount of data being
collected and how those data are being used.
Conversely, trust could be less important in the face of a global pandemic, when society might be
more willing to acquiesce to things it would otherwise reject under regular conditions.
Individuals may be more willing to accept government surveillance if it reduces the spread of a
deadly disease, even in the absence of trustworthy actors or protections. Historically, during
times of acute crisis (e.g., riots, natural disasters), Americans have seen their rights restricted to
protect citizens from different harms (Finkelman, 2003). In the case of COVID-19, some people
— including a team of scientists at the forefront of tracking the pandemic — have argued for the
oft-used tradeoff of giving up some personal privacy to benefit public health (Servick, 2020).
From this perspective, people should be willing to provide institutions with sensitive personal
information (i.e., location data) because it reduces the spread of COVID-19.
The trade-off between privacy and public benefit
The concept of privacy has been framed through a number of lenses, for example, Smith and
colleagues (2011) describe how privacy can be viewed as a right — invoking Warren and
Brandeis’ (1890) early writing on privacy — or as a temporary state of “withdrawal of a person
from the general society,” as described by Westin [2]. The authors also note that privacy is often
framed as a commodity, focusing on the economic nature of privacy whereby people exchange
private information for some physical or informational good.
Privacy calculus (Culnan, 1993; Laufer and Wolfe, 1977) invokes privacy as a commodity. The
theory describes a cost-benefit analysis for decision-making that includes disclosure of personal
information, such as when one uses an e-commerce site or downloads a mobile app. Culnan and
Bies (2003) argue that people are more likely to accept a loss in privacy when the benefits of the
transaction outweigh the risks. Looking at e-commerce transactions, Dinev and Hart (2006)
found that trust and Internet interests can overcome concerns about privacy risks associated with
sharing sensitive data. For example, when deciding whether to make an online purchase, a
person may compare potential risks (e.g., if the site uses encryption, trust in the company) with
potential benefits (e.g., scarcity of desired product, speed of delivery). Such an approach would
suggest that people may deprioritize privacy concerns in the context of a contact-tracing app
given its potential health benefits.
Privacy calculus has high face validity; however, this framework has been criticized for being
overly simplistic in accounting for the complexity of decision-making involved in trading private
information for some benefit. For example, Turow and colleagues (2015) argue that Americans’
increasing willingness to trade personal information for benefits cannot be explained by a
rational assessment where they determine that the tradeoffs are fair. Instead, the researchers
argue that Americans have become deeply resigned to sharing their data and that they lack the
agency to control or manage it. Other studies have highlighted a similar sense of resignation or
apathy to explain why people disclose personal information on social media platforms and in
other digital spaces (Hargittai and Marwick, 2016; Hoffmann, et al., 2016). Such a perspective
would suggest that when given an actual choice, people may opt against giving up their privacy.
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Instead of looking at privacy attitudes and behaviors as an economic and context-neutral
exchange, a more helpful way to account for the complexities of information flow is to focus on
the contextual factors that affect the norms and appropriateness of those flows. In the next
section, we unpack this idea more by describing Nissenbaum’s (2010) framing of privacy as
contextual integrity, and consider how the distributor of a contact-tracing app may affect a
person’s willingness to use that app.
Privacy as contextual integrity
As digital technologies become increasingly embedded in our everyday lives, they introduce new
flows of information that frequently shift boundaries and challenge privacy norms. Such
dynamism is central to the notion of networked privacy, which Marwick and boyd (2014) define
as the “ongoing negotiation of contexts in a networked ecosystem in which contexts regularly
blur and collapse” [3]. Such blurring and collapsing of contexts seem inevitable when we ask
citizens to trust contact-tracing apps with their location and health data. Nissenbaum’s (2010)
theory of contextual integrity (CI) takes context as its starting point, making it a useful
framework for considering the privacy implications of contact-tracing apps and the larger
infrastructures that support them. Rejecting the public/private dichotomy that dominates most
approaches to privacy, CI instead rests on the understanding that information flows occur within
particular contexts, and the theory ties adequate privacy protection to respecting informational
norms within those contexts.
Nissenbaum summarizes the fundamentals of CI via four theses. Thesis 1 asserts that privacy, to
be a useful concept, must center on the appropriateness of flows of personal information, rather
than categorizations of information (e.g., as sensitive or secret). Thesis 2 argues that flows of
personal information are only appropriate when they conform to informational norms “that
describe, prescribe, proscribe, and establish expectations for characteristic contextual behaviors
and practices” [4]. Such norms shape people’s expectations about appropriate information flows
within particular contexts.
Thesis 3 sets out three key parameters that define informational norms: actors, attributes, and
transmission principles. Actors refer to the parties involved in a given interaction, including
senders, receivers, and subjects of information. In the case of contact-tracing apps, actors include
the app distributors and people asked to install said apps, and perhaps third parties such as health
providers or insurance companies. Attributes describe the nature of the data that is flowing
among the actors, and for contact-tracing apps this might include people’s location, proximity to
others, and health data. Transmission principles shape or constrain the flow of information, such
as with doctor-patient confidentiality when disclosing health status. With contact-tracing apps,
the principle of fiduciary most clearly delineates the relationship between users and the
recipients of their data; this differs significantly from more traditional health disclosures between
a doctor and patient, which are guided by the principle of confidentiality. Isolating these
parameters yields a rich set of variables with which to characterize — and ultimately assess —
the appropriateness of data flows within a given context.
Contextual integrity’s fourth thesis provides the means for assessing the impact of a new
technology or practice that disrupts a parameter by conflicting with existing contextual
informational norms: “A practice violates a privacy norm if resulting flows fail to map onto
expected values for the parameters” [5]. To determine what, if anything, should be done to
address the violation, CI calls for a wider examination of the moral and political implications of
the new practice and how it might affect the prevailing values, goals, and ends of the context in
question. For example, while an update to a fitness tracking app to enable tracking one’s body
temperature and sharing that data with health authorities might constitute a disruption of the
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contextual integrity of health information flows between a user and a technology developer, this
disruption of CI would need to be balanced against the public health benefit of using contact-
tracing apps during a global health pandemic.
At first glance, contextual integrity provides an easy way to explain the strong negative reaction
by many to reports of governments seeking to track citizens’ locations directly via their
smartphones in order to enforce social distancing and engage in contact tracing (Newton, 2020;
Tau, 2020). While individuals might be comfortable sharing their location with Google or
Garmin to receive services like navigation and fitness tracking, having that data flow to
government officials for long-term monitoring of citizen movements — a change in both the
actor and transmission principles — may be deemed an inappropriate new information flow. Yet,
as the COVID-19 global pandemic continues, there is increasing pressure to embrace contact
tracing, and trust the technology developers and government agencies to balance individual
privacy with the need to ensure public health adequately. Contextual integrity provides a helpful
theoretical framework for considering these tensions and evaluating what the public considers
appropriate information flows during a health crisis. In the context of contact-tracing apps, one
way this manifests itself concerns the distributor of said apps.
Research questions
The adoption and use of contact-tracing apps amid the COVID-19 global pandemic depends
greatly on people’s trust in the actors involved, as well as whether such a solution preserves the
contextual integrity of data flows by maintaining appropriate transmission principles. For
example, do Americans feel differently about apps developed and distributed by medical groups
versus the government? Are they willing to adopt apps distributed by tech companies that
already collect significant personal information? To gain an understanding of the factors
associated with willingness to use a contact-tracing app distributed by these entities, we ask the
following research questions:
RQ1: Who is willing to install a COVID-19 tracking app
regardless of the distributor?
RQ1a: Who is willing to install a COVID-19
tracking app from more than one distributor?
RQ2: How does the distributor of a COVID-19 tracking
app relate to people’s willingness to adopt it?
RQ2a: How does willingness to install from a
particular distributor relate to a willingness to install
from other distributors?
RQ2b: How do sociodemographic factors, political
leaning, Internet skills, medical factors related to
COVID-19, and institutional trust vary across people’s
willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app from
specific distributors?
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Methods
Data collection
We collected survey data from American adults ages 18 and over during 4–8 April 2020. We
contracted with the Cint online survey firm to reach a diverse sample. Cint’s respondent pool
includes over 15 million people gathered through a double opt-in procedure, participants are
compensated for their time. We quota sampled on age, gender, education, and region to match
U.S. Census figures. Those sociodemographic factors are often related to Internet use and so we
wanted to make sure our sample varied on those characteristics (Robinson, et al., 2015).
Respondents come from all 50 U.S. states plus Washington, D.C. At the beginning of our data
collection, the U.S. had 307,876 confirmed COVID-19 cases and there had been 8,359
COVID-19 deaths (Wikipedia, 2020).
We implemented attention-verification questions and removed cases that failed more than one,
which constituted 4.6 percent of the 1,441 original respondents (Berinsky, et al., 2014) resulting
in 1,374 valid cases. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the 1,254 respondents who reported
having a mobile phone at home with Internet access given that the question is most realistically
applicable to them.
Measures: Dependent variable
Whenever possible, we relied on previous work for our questions. Given the novelty of the
situation, this was not possible with questions specifically about the pandemic so we did
extensive pretesting of those. After pretesting the instrument in our research group, we
conducted in-depth pilot tests with seventy respondents on Amazon Mechanical Turk as a way to
conduct cognitive interviews at scale. We asked multiple open-ended questions about our
pandemic-specific items, probing respondents’ difficulty with answering the questions,
interpretation of specific terms in the questions, and overall comprehension of the questions. We
iteratively refined and tested survey wording until respondents consistently and correctly
understood our items. This is how we arrived at the following question to assess people’s
willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app, which does not assume agreement, rather,
explicitly asks whether people would agree to installing an app:
If there was a tracking app that could help slow the
spread of the Coronavirus in your community and reduce
the lockdown period, would you agree to install it on
your phone knowing that it would collect your location
data and information about your health status?
This question was then followed by several options and respondents were asked to check all that
apply:
Yes, if a not-for-profit organization verified by a public
authority distributes the app
Yes, if the federal government distributes the app
Yes, if my local government distributes the app
Yes, if a health protection agency (such as CDC, FDA)
distributes the app
Yes, if my health insurance provider distributes the app
Yes, if an international organization distributes the app
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Yes, if a technology company distributes the app
Yes, if the main public university in my state distributes
the app
No, I would not agree to install it in any of the above
cases
For our measure of whether someone is amenable to installing such an app (RQ1), we created a
variable that indicates having chosen any of the Yes options versus having chosen the No option.
(Respondents who chose both a Yes and the No option were coded as missing for this question
and are excluded from the analyses; there were five such cases.) We also examined who would
be willing to install apps from multiple providers and for this we created a summary variable of
Yes responses. To address RQ2 and RQ2a, we created separate dummy variables for each of the
Yes responses.
Measures: Independent variables
Sociodemographics. We measured age by asking for respondents’ birth year and subtracted that
from 2020. Gender options were male, female, and other, which we recoded into a female gender
category (1 vs. 0 for all others). We measured education level by asking for respondents’ highest
level of school completed with six options, which we recoded into three: high school degree or
less, some college, and college degree or more. We asked about household income through 13
categories ranging from less than US$10,000 to US$200,000 or more, which we then recoded to
midpoint values to create a continuous variable. We use a logged version of this in the regression
models. To assess people’s metropolitan status, the answer options were: a big city, the suburbs
or outskirts of a big city, a town or a small city, or a rural area, and recoded this into a binary
variable reflecting urban residence (value of 1 for those who live in a big or small city) versus
other (0).
To determine people’s political ideology, we used the American National Election Studies (2020)
question: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?” The choices were those three, plus “No preference.” Independents and
no-preference respondents were asked a follow-up: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the
Republican or Democratic Party.” We use information from these two questions to create a
dummy variable for Republican-leaning political ideology versus other.
Internet skills. Understanding the Internet better may influence people’s attitudes toward app
installation so we wanted to control for Internet skills. We use the established six-item Web-use
skills scale (Hargittai and Hsieh, 2012) to do this by averaging the six values.
Medical factors related to COVID-19. People who belong to the medically high-risk category for
COVID-19, those who live in a household with medical workers, and those who know others
with the disease (or who themselves have been diagnosed with it) may approach tracking apps
differently so we wanted to account for this in our models. We asked people whether they have
various medical conditions (e.g., high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, cancer) that
constitute high-risk and created a dummy variable for this. We also asked: “Do you or anyone in
your household currently work at a healthcare facility, or visit a healthcare facility for work
reasons, where Coronavirus (COVID-19) patients are cared for?” and created a dummy for those
who answered yes (=1). We also wanted to account for whether people know of others who have
tested positive and asked: “Do you know any people who have been diagnosed with Coronavirus
(COVID-19)?” creating another dummy variable (1 for knowing someone).
Trust in institutions. A willingness to install a COVID-tracing app may be related to people’s
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trust in the types of institutions that are distributing such apps. To account for this, we asked:
“Below are some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are
concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly
any confidence at all in them in addressing the Coronavirus pandemic?” The institutions
included: “medical system,” “federal government,” “state/local government,” “business leaders”
with three answer options: a great deal of confidence (value of 3), only some confidence (2),
hardly any confidence (1).
The sample
Table 1 presents sample characteristics. Ages range from 18–82 with a median of 43, mean of
44.7. Just over half (53.6 percent) of respondents identify as female. Just under half (46.2
percent) live in big cities or smaller cities and towns. About half have no more than a high school
education and less than a third have a college degree or more. The average household income is
US$60,000. There is a close-to equal split of Democrat-leaning (54 percent) and Republican-
leaning respondents. Over a third (37 percent) of respondents belong to a medically high-risk
category for COVID-19 and eighteen percent know someone who has been infected.
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We start by sharing basic descriptives about willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app.
Then, to examine who is most amenable to installing a COVID-19 tracking app, we construct
two binomial logistic regression models with (1) whether the respondent was willing to install a
coronavirus app from at least one provider as the dependent variable; and (2) whether the
respondent was willing to install a COVID-19 app from just one provider versus more than one.
In both cases, we include sociodemographics, Internet skills, political ideology, and COVID-19
experiences as the independent variables. To understand which distributors were most popular,
we used X2 proportion tests to compare the proportion of respondents who preferred each
provider. We correct for multiple testing effects using Bonferroni-Holm (BH) correction where
appropriate. Additionally, to explore differences in which respondents were willing to install
apps from different distributors, we constructed binomial logistic regression models for
willingness to install an app from each of the distributors. We did not construct models for apps
distributed by public universities or international organizations because fewer than 200
respondents (<16 percent) of our sample reported being willing to install an app from either of
these distributors, and 200 cases is the threshold for robust regression modeling (King and Zeng,
2001).
Results
Willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app
RQ1 asked about people’s willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app at all, and RQ1a asked
about who would be willing to do so from multiple distributors. Overall, two-thirds (66.9
percent) of respondents would be willing to install a COVID-19 tracking app from at least one of
the distributors we asked about. Half (50.5 percent) were only willing to install an app from one
of the listed distributors, 15.9 percent from two distributors, 13.8 percent from up to three
distributors, and the remaining 12.2 percent from 4–8 distributors (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Number of distributors from which respondents who were willing to install COVID-19 app
install.
To determine whether background factors relate to people’s willingness to install a COVID-19
tracking app, we ran binary logistic regression models on willingness to install at all and
willingness to install from more than one distributor compared to one. For the first, we coded
those who selected at least one of the providers as “1” while those who selected “No, I would not
agree to install it in any of the above cases” as “0”. The first model looks at how
sociodemographics, political ideology, personal COVID-19 experiences and Internet skills relate
to willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app. The results (see Table 2) suggest that older
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adults are somewhat less willing to install such an app, while those more educated are
considerably more willing. Being at a high risk of COVID-19 or knowing someone who has
COVID-19 is associated with a higher willingness to install an app, as is having higher Internet
skills. Next, we added four variables measuring confidence in various institutional actors
addressing the pandemic (i.e., medical system, federal government, local/state government, and
business leaders), to assess whether trust in these institutions affected people’s willingness to
download. While age became a stronger predictor of willingness to install an app and education
less strong, the other findings from the earlier model remained robust. Additionally, those who
have a higher confidence in the medical system were more willing to install a COVID-19
tracking app. Confidence in other institutional actors plays no role when considering all
institutional confidence together. We do not find that willingness to install apps differs by
political leaning. Specifically, 68.8 percent of Democrats and Democrat-leaning respondents
were willing to install a COVID-19 tracking app, while 64.7 percent of Republicans and
Republican-leaning respondents were willing to install. At the time of our study, early April
2020, measures to mitigate COVID-19 were nearly-equally supported by Democrats and
Republicans (Van Green and Tyson, 2020).
View of Americans’ willingness to adopt a COVID-19 tracking app | Fir... https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/11095/9985?in...
12 von 26 28.01.2021, 12:12
Table 2: Binary logistic regression predicting willingness to adopt a COVID-19 tracking app from a set 
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To examine willingness to download apps from multiple providers, we conducted a binary
logistic regression with the dependent variable being whether a person was willing to download
from just one of the potential distributors (coded as “0”) or from more than one of the
distributors (coded as “1”). The second set of models on Table 2 shows the results. We again first
excluded the confidence-in-institutions measures and in the second model included those as well.
In both models, the only factor that explains the willingness to adopt more than one app is
Internet skills, which shows a positive association.
The relationship between distributor and willingness to install a COVID-19 tracking app
Respondents were divided on the distributors from which they would be willing to install a
COVID-19 tracking app. As shown in Figure 2, over one-third of respondents (37 percent)
indicated their willingness to install a coronavirus tracking app distributed by a Health Protection
Agency (HPA) like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) or the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), with 13 percent indicating they would only be comfortable with that type
of distributor. Significantly fewer (BH corrected X2 proportion test, p<0.05) respondents were
willing to install an app distributed by their health insurance provider (22 percent), the federal
government (20 percent), local government (20 percent), or a technology company (19 percent).
The least acceptable distributors (BH corrected X2 proportion test, p<0.05) were a public
university (12 percent) or an international organization (11 percent).
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Figure 2: Percentage of sample who selected each of the distributor options. Percentages in dark green r
only listed that option; percentages in light green reflect responses that also included at least one 
RQ2a asked how willingness to install from one distributor related to willingness to install from
another. We created a correlation matrix to identify the most and least common pairings across
the eight distributor options. The strongest correlation was between HPAs and health insurance
(co-occurring 14 percent of the time), pointing to the strength of health actors distributing a
health-related app. The data also shows a strong correlation between those willing to use an
HPA-distributed app and those willing to use those from local or federal governments (13
percent co-occurrence for each). For distributors that had a low adoption willingness, co-
occurrence with other apps was consistently low. Figure 3 shows commonly occurring pairs of
distributors.
Figure 3: Percentage of two contact-tracing app distributors being selected by the same resp
RQ2b asked how user characteristics relate to what distributor is acceptable for installing a
COVID-19 tracking app. We conducted a series of binary logistic regressions to answer this for
each of the six most popular distributors: HPA, health insurance, the federal government, local
government, a technology company, and a nonprofit. Looking across the models, some trends
emerge. See Table 3 for details.
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Table 3: Binary logistic regressions predicting willingness to adopt COVID-19 tracking apps from six t
There are no systematic differences by sociodemographic factors. While females are much less
likely to want to install from a technology company, there are no gender differences for the other
distributors. Age matters only in the case of nonprofits where older adults are less likely to want
to install. Those at high risk of COVID-19 are more willing to install from HPAs and nonprofits.
Internet skills emerged as a significant factor in all but one of the models, with those reporting
greater skills being more willing to adopt an app distributed by HPAs, the federal government,
state/local government, nonprofits, and a technology company.
When it comes to confidence in various institutional actors’ ability to respond to the pandemic
effectively, it proved to be important in all cases except for a technology company as a
distributor, where confidence in business leaders was unrelated, possibly as that category is not
directly about technology companies per se. Trust in the medical system was positively related to
willingness to adopt from a health protection agency as well as a health insurance provider. Trust
in the federal government was positively linked with a willingness to install from the federal
government, and trust in state/local government was positively associated with local/state
government as the distributor.
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Discussion
With the global COVID-19 pandemic, governments, health agencies, and other groups
immediately began exploring technological approaches to minimize the spread of the disease.
Contact-tracing apps — which rely on Bluetooth proximity data or GPS location data from
mobile devices ubiquitous in many parts of the world — quickly became one of the most
discussed tools to help identify and notify those who had been exposed. We collected the data in
this paper in early April 2020, a few weeks after the United States began a lockdown, so news
about COVID-19, and discussions about contact-tracing apps, were widespread at the time of
data collection.
While other national polls and surveys have focused on general measures of adoption (Anderson
and Auxier, 2020; e.g., Timberg, et al., 2020), we approached the question of contact-tracing
apps by evaluating whether the distributor of such an app affected people’s willingness to adopt
it. In other words, do Americans’ attitudes differ when considering a contact-tracing app
distributed by a health protection agency as opposed to one distributed by a technology company,
the government, a nonprofit, and international organization, or an academic institution?
This framing of the question allows us to consider the privacy implications of information flows
through Nissenbaum’s (2019, 2010) framework of privacy as contextual integrity (CI). As
described above, preserving the contextual integrity of new information flows rests on preserving
existing informational norms surrounding three key parameters that define informational norms:
actors, attributes, and transmission principles. According to CI, privacy violations are likely to
occur when the norms across any of these parameters become disrupted; this includes changes to
the actor involved in data collection and processing, as well as changes to the transmission
principles that typically guide information flows, such as the principle of confidentiality guiding
health disclosures. The analysis presented above allows us to focus on the appropriateness of
different actors involved in health-related disclosures and whether Americans view those actors
as appropriate collectors of sensitive data.
First, when thinking about entities involved in developing and deploying contact-tracing apps,
three groups have received the most attention: health agencies, governments (federal and local),
and technology companies, as seen most notably in Apple and Google’s exposure notification
system. Looking across the eight distributors included in the survey, HPAs and insurance
providers were viewed as the most appropriate distributors of a COVID-19 tracking app by our
respondents, with HPAs being the lone acceptable distributor for some, or typically paired with
other distributors. This may seem unsurprising on its surface, but it highlights how much actors
and transmission principles play a role in determining the appropriateness of information flows,
even in the face of a global pandemic. While some might argue that people should be willing to
take any and all steps to fight against a global pandemic, our results show that the distributor
plays an important role in one’s willingness to adopt a contact-tracing app, and that data flows
viewed as most appropriate (in this case, individual health data flowing to health-based actors) is
seen as the most appealing. The larger the number of users who adopt a contact-tracing app, the
more effective it is (Kreps, et al., 2020). Thus, ensuring that the data collected by the app are
normatively aligned with the distributor is vital as users are more comfortable adopting an app if
the distributor is an actor who is trusted to maintain appropriate transmission principles when it
comes to personal health data. These findings offer policy implications for which distributors
should be issuing contact-tracing apps and suggest that an inter-operable ecosystem of partnered
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apps may help maximize adoption.
In addition to viewing an actor’s collection of certain types of data, trust plays an important role
in assessing whether CI has been violated, as violations of the contextual integrity of information
flow have been shown to impact trust in institutions negatively (Martin, 2018). For example,
individuals’ trust that transmission principles will be preserved informs what they consider
appropriate data flows; if a data breach, for example, reveals to consumers that their data were
not properly secured, their trust in that actor will be negatively impacted. In the survey, we
measured respondents’ trust in actors by asking whether they had a great deal, some, or hardly
any confidence in four institutions’ ability to respond to the pandemic: medical system, local
government, federal government, and business leaders. Confidence in the medical system was
positively correlated with willingness to adopt an app, and to adopt apps from the two healthcare
distributors (HPAs and health insurers). Likewise, we found that confidence in the federal
government and state government was associated with one’s willingness to adopt apps from
those distributors, which highlights trust’s role in accepting an information flow, even when the
actor and context are not directly aligned. The role that this (mis)alignment plays in evaluations
of a contact-tracing app is especially apparent when looking at people’s willingness to adopt any
of the proposed apps. When controlling for other factors, only trust in the medical system
predicted one’s willingness to download a COVID-19 tracking app.
CI offers a unique view into why certain distributors of health tracking apps are trusted over
others. Recognizing the importance of transmission principles, Nissenbaum (2010) notes how
technological solutions often violate the principle of confidentiality that has historically been at
the core of medical practice “in the name of improved healthcare delivery and medical
outcomes” [6]. CI reminds us that the transmission principles governing norms of information
flow matter, and that not just any distributor supporting public health will be deemed acceptable.
As individuals remain skeptical of the ability of government and industry to manage their health
data safely, our findings confirm that those who have a historical and ethical commitment to
maintaining the contextual integrity of existing transmission principles will be most trusted, even
when faced with a global pandemic.
CI also asks for a wider examination of the moral and political implications of new information
flows to make a more complete assessment as to whether technology should be allowed or
resisted. Nissenbaum (2010) urges consideration of more than just adherence to transmission
principles, but also that we consider how new practices and information flows might pose threats
to autonomy and freedom, asking: “What might be the effects on power structures, implications
for justice, fairness, equality, social hierarchy, democracy, and so on?” [7]. When considered in
this vein, even if competing contact-tracing apps collect and process the same information in the
same ways, the broader commitment of HPAs to support public health poses less of a moral or
political risk to Americans than those of government or industry, with the latter considered more
likely to engage in practices that might unfairly impact individuals (Auxier, et al., 2019).
Examining our findings more broadly sheds light on some individual differences worth further
discussion. The role of respondent age across our models is notable since younger respondents
were less willing to adopt any contact-tracing app although this does not hold once we control
for institutional trust. This age finding appears counterintuitive given the general embrace of
technology and apps by the younger populace, but there are several possible explanations. This
could be due to the early belief that younger people were less susceptible to COVID-19 and thus
had no need to even consider a tracking app, or perhaps a general distrust among younger
Americans in key institutions; data from the Pew Research Center highlights that young adults
have the lowest trust in elected officials, law enforcement, and business leaders than any other
age group (Gramlich, 2019). Indeed, the fact that age is no longer significant once we control for
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institutional trust suggests this may well be the case.
The other standout finding was that respondents with higher Internet skills were more willing to
adopt an app from all distributors except health insurance providers. This suggests that for these
participants, their comfort and perceived savviness with Internet technologies might give them
the confidence to address any possible privacy concerns related to contact-tracing apps, even
when distributed by actors lacking a longstanding commitment to maintaining transmission
principles within the healthcare context.
Limitations and future work
While getting an early account of individuals’ trust in institutions and willingness to download a
COVID-19 tracking app is important, one limitation of this study is that the American public’s
understanding of COVID-19 and how best to respond to the growing pandemic was still evolving
in April 2020. For example, we suggest that young people may have expressed less willingness
to use a contact-tracing app because young people were initially seen as being at low risk; since
that time, this belief has been disproven (Rabin, 2020) and may have changed younger adults’
attitudes toward apps. Future work could compare later opinions with these early results to
determine any changes in the public’s trust and willingness to embrace contact tracking.
An additional limitation relates to the broad wording of the primary question posed to
respondents about their willingness to install a tracking app. Again, as data collection occurred
prior to general public awareness of approaches offered by Apple/Google and related providers,
the question was silent as to the specificity of locational data that would be collected (GPS
location, Bluetooth proximity to other users, etc), how long data would be retained, who might
have access, and so on (Redmiles, 2020). Leveraging the various parameters that contribute to
preserving contextual integrity, future work could include measures across various possible data
attributes.
There are also potential limitations concerning the relationship of participants to COVID-19.
There was nothing in the survey invitation to suggest that it was a study about the pandemic and
thus related interest or lack thereof should not have driven participation. While we asked a
question about following coronavirus-related news, we do not have assessments of people’s
concern about catching the virus or its repercussions for their personal lives nor whether they
even believe COVID-19 to be a real threat to anyone. In the future, such questions about
pandemics chould be included.
Conclusion
When making decisions about technological interventions to resolve a crisis like COVID-19,
there are a number of important questions that should be addressed during the design process.
Contextual integrity provides a useful framework through which to identify and address the
appropriateness of data flows between the users (in this case, the American public) and the
provider of that technology.
In this paper, we found that while two-thirds of our respondents indicated a willingness to
download a COVID-19 tracking app to stop the spread of the virus, the institution distributing
the app affected said willingness. Distributors already operating in health contexts were most
frequently selected, and trust in the medical system’s ability to respond to the pandemic was
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positively associated with willingness to adopt. Viewed through the lens of contextual integrity,
the appropriateness of how a contact-tracing app might disrupt personal information flows was
tied to a distributor’s ability to respect and preserve existing transmission principles: a health
protection agency was preferred over other government or industry bodies presumably because
such an agency is already entrusted with ensuring patient confidentiality.
Our findings suggest that policy-makers and technology developers alike need to recognize that
merely promising to protect individual privacy is not sufficient to ensure that the contextual
integrity of our health information is preserved. Instead, developers and regulators must consider
several factors related to who is collecting the data, whether data transmission between the
sender and recipient is perceived as appropriate, and what underlying principles guide these
disclosures. Individuals expect the preservation of longstanding transmission principles within
the health context, and providers entering from outside that context, even during a global
pandemic and with the best of intentions, may not be trusted (Nissenbaum, 2010). Furthermore,
solutions proposed by these institutions may be met with skepticism when there have been prior
breaches of contextual integrity; in the U.S., the public has consistently reported low trust in
government and industry following Edward Snowden’s revelations about government spying
(Lupton and Michael, 2017), as well as data breaches like Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica
scandal (Kahn and Ingram, 2018).
In the case of COVID-19, we recommend that tools that collect sensitive personal information —
including location data like GPS or Bluetooth proximity information, as well as health and
contact data — provide clear guidance on not just what data are being collected, but also what
actors will access that data, how long that data will be kept, and what limitations will be placed
on uses of the data. Ensuring the actors involved in data collection have clear connections to the
health context is one way to increase trust in the tool, as is engaging in data minimization
practices to ensure that contact-tracing apps do not become a part of the larger “function creep”
happening with mobile data. To establish trust, these data should only be used for the narrow
purpose of minimizing the spread of COVID-19 and deployed by distributors with a
longstanding commitment to preserving the confidentiality of health data without extending to
other forms of surveillance and monitoring of individuals. In combination, these design
guidelines can help encourage the adoption of COVID-19 apps from trustworthy distributors that
can limit the spread of the virus and protect the public, both in terms of their health as well as
their privacy. 
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